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The Arc Sine Law and the Treasury Bill Futures Market 
 
By Charles Dale and Rosemarie Workman1 
 
A long succession of coin tosses in a game in which one person wins if a head turns up, 
the other if a tail turns up, is analogous to speculation in price movements of a financial 
asset, where the long investor wins if price moves up and the short investor wins if price 
moves down. If we predicted that, over the course of these two games, each player 
would be in the lead about half the time, we would be wrong.  
 
The counterintuitive fact is that the odds overwhelmingly favor one player being 
in the lead the vast majority of the time. Indeed, each player being in the lead half the 
time is the least likely outcome. If a coin is tossed every second for a year, there is a 10 
per cent chance that the lead will change hands for the last time before the end of the 
ninth day, remaining in the same hands for the next 356 days. 
  
According to the so-called "arc sine law," mechanical trading rules applied to 
price movements in financial assets will result in long periods of cumulative success, but 
equally long periods of cumulative failure. The long periods of success will tempt 
investors to apply trading rules to actual decisions. The long periods of failure make it 
very likely that such application will eventually blow them out of the market. 
  
As long as a trading rule produces a consistent profit over long time periods, its 
advocates are unlikely to be dissuaded by theoretical arguments about random walks. 
Such rules will probably be around indefinitely. 
  
                                                          
1 Charles Dale is an International Economist in the Office of Planning and Research, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. He was formerly a Financial Economist with the Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury. Rosemarie Workman is a Financial Economist in the 
Office of Government Financing, U.S. Department of the Treasury. She specializes in studies of the 
impact of financial markets on the U.S. economy. The views expressed in this article are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Treasury or Commerce Departments. 
2 
 
In the long-standing debate between random walkers and chartists, the former have 
frequently turned to one or more nonparametric statistics tests to prove the existence of 
the random walk (or any of the related versions of the efficient market hypothesis), while 
the latter have demonstrated time and again that some type of mechanical trading rule 
can uncover profitable opportunities in speculative markets.2 A very significant but 
poorly understood law of probability theory--the arc sine law--suggests that the random 
walkers may never be able to convince the technicians. This article examines the arc 
sine law in the context of the Treasury bill futures market. 
 
The Arc Sine Law 
Consider a two-person game involving the toss of a coin: One person wins if a head 
turns up, the other if a tail turns up. Suppose we had to predict the results of a large 
number of such games after a single coin toss; this would roughly correspond to 
examining the daily price change of a large number of different types of futures 
contracts. We would expect about half the coin tosses to be heads and half tails, and 
we would be more or less correct.  
But what if, instead of examining the single results of many different games, we were to 
look at only one game over a long period of time? This would correspond to examining 
price movements in only one futures contract over an extended period. We might 
predict that, over the course of the game, each player would be in the lead about half 
the time. We would be wrong. The startling, baffling and counterintuitive fact is that the 
odds are overwhelmingly in favor of one player being in the lead the vast majority of the 
time.  
A change in the lead from one player to the other requires that the two attain 
"equalization"-that is, return to their starting points of zero net winnings. Equalization 
can occur only after a coin has been tossed an even number of times. The probability of 
equalization (uk) after k (≡2j) tosses can be shown to be:3 
uk   =  (2j)!/j!j!2k,  j = 1,2,3,….     (1) 
 
The probability that the last equalization during a given game of length n will occur at 
time k is given by: 
 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Fred D. Arditti and W. Andrew McCollough, "Can Analysts Distinguish Between Real 
and Randomly Generated Stock Prices?" Financial Analysts Journal, November/December 1978, pp. 70-
74, and references contained therein. 
3 See "Fluctuations in Coin Tossing and Random Walks," Chapter 3 of William Feller, An Introduction to 
Probability Theory and its Applications, 3rd edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968) pp. 67-97. 
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   Pk,n  = ukun-k ,       (2) 
 
where the u's are given by Equation 1. Because Equation 2 may be approximated by 
the trigonometric arc sine function, it is called the "arc sine law for last visits," or simply 
the "arc sine law." 
 
The arc sine function is a U-shaped curve, with the smallest value at the midpoint. 
Applied to Equation 2, this means that the probability that each player in our coin 
tossing game is in the lead exactly half the time is the least likely outcome! The shape 
of the relevant probability distribution is such that the odds overwhelmingly favor one 
person being in the lead most of the time. To use an example, if a coin is tossed every 
second for a year, there is a 10 per cent chance that the last equalization will occur 
before the end of the ninth day, with the lead remaining in the same hands for the next 
356 days.4 
 
An individual futures contract is similar to one of these coin tossing games. The odds 
greatly favor an upward or downward drift in the price movements of an individual 
contract. Since most mechanical trading rules are applied to individual contracts, it 
follows that these rules may work for a while, simply because of the seemingly strange 
expected behavior of individual contracts. But the same arc sine law that makes likely 
periods of extended success dictates the equal likelihood of periods of extended failure. 
With non-zero transactions costs, traders who religiously use mechanical trading rules 
will eventually get blown out of the market. 
 
The Treasury Bill Futures Market 
 
Trading in 90-day Treasury bill futures began in 1976, on the International Monetary 
Market Division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Each futures contract calls for 
delivery of one million dollars worth of 90, 91 or 92-day Treasury bills. Typically, the 
margin requirement has been about $800 per contract and commissions have been 
about $60 per round trip. 
 
While several types of mechanical trading rule have been applied to futures trading, we 
will discuss one of the most popular techniques-the use of moving averages.5 Moving 
averages work as follows: The trader sums the closing prices over x days and then 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 We obtained similar results using other trading rules, i.e., stop-loss orders, trailing stop-loss orders and 
filter rules. Tables of these results may be obtained from the authors.  See also Charles Dale, "Brownian 
Motion in the Treasury Bill Futures Market," Business Economics, May 1981, pp. 47-54, for a different 
approach to random price movements that confirms our results. 
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divides by x to obtain an average price. Each day, he drops the oldest price and uses 
the new closing price to compute a new average. Whenever a price goes above the 
average computed at the end of the previous day, he makes a purchase. Whenever the 
price on a given day drops below the previous day's computed average, he both 
liquidates his long contract and sells a contract short. Any position held at the end of the 
trading period is liquidated. 
 
We assume that the speculator would trade only one contract at a time, hence would 
require an initial margin deposit of $800. However, since futures markets all have a daily 
settlement, a speculator may be forced to put up more money to hold an unprofitable 
position.6 We assume he will always put up whatever additional funds are necessary. 
(While perhaps unrealistic, this assumption better illustrates the working of the arc sine 
law.)  
 
Table I shows the results from trading on the basis of the moving average rules. For the 
first contract, only the 10-day moving average showed a profit; using the 10-day moving 
average would have produced good results until 1978. While it is true that all 12 
contracts taken together exhibited net profits, the reader may ask himself, after viewing 
the results, just how confident he would be in starting from scratch and using the 10-day 
moving average rule on new contracts.7 
 
The popular 30-day moving average showed five consecutive winners. The decision to 
use a trading rule is typically made after just such a run of winners. Yet, in this case, the 
winners were followed by five consecutive losers. Putting the 30-day rule into practice 
after mid-1977 would have produced enormous losses.8  
 
 
                                                          
6 A theoretical model which utilizes this feature of daily settlement, or "marking to the market," is given 
by Fischer Black, "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, April 1976, pp. 
167-179. 
7 See Peter D. Praetz, "On the Methodology of Testing for Independence in Future Prices: Comment," 
Journal of Finance, June 1976, pp. 977-979; Robert M. Bear and Richard A. Stevenson, "Reply (to a 
Comment by P.D. Praetz)," Journal of Finance, June 1976, pp. 980-983; and Raymond M. Leuthold, 
"Reply (to a Comment by P.D. Praetz)," Journal of Finance, June 1976, pp. 984-985, for a discussion of 
this point. Leuthold in particular makes the point that many speculators would like to trade and obtain 
profits, regardless of whether prices are moving randomly or not. This is precisely the reason that 
mechanical trading rules, which are widely misunderstood, can be such a dangerous trap for the 
unsophisticated investor. 
8 Various forms and combinations of moving averages are frequently limped together with the phrase, 
"momentum analyses." For a dramatic display of the erratic results obtained when using such models 
for forecasting foreign exchange rates, see Stephen H. Goodman, "No Better than the Toss of a Coin," 
Euromoney, December 1978, pp. 75-85. 
5 
 
Table I  Moving Average Rules, 90-Day T-Bill Futures 
Moving 
Average 
(Days)   Mar 76   Jun 76   Sep 76   Dec 76   Mar 77   Jun 77   Sep 77   Dec 77   Mar 78   Jun 78   Sep 78   Dec 78 
 
60   0a           145      1170      5435        270      -2440     -2830      -800      -2300     -1250     -1990      2730 
  (0)b         (180)    (480)     (240)       (780)      (540)      (780)     (300)      (600)      (600)      (840)      (420) 
 
50   0          -1505      1910     5010        2855     -3695    -1660      -425      -1330      -2565    -1065      3030 
  (0)          (480)    (240)      (240)       (420)   (1020)     (660)      (300)      (780)     (1140)      (840)     (420) 
 
40 -95         -1910     -1875     5175        3030       380     -4015      -290      -3795      -2585    -1005       2805 
(120)       (360)      (600)    (300)        (420)     (420)   (1140)     (540)     (1020)     (1260)   (1080)    (1420) 
 
30 -1000      1285       3660     5920        3980       885    -4825     -1610     -2555       -2285   -3675        960 
  (300)      (240)      (240)    (180)        (420)      (540)    (900)      (960)    (1080)      (1260)   (1500)     (840) 
 
20  -515       1910       6615     5370        4410      -880     -2150      -910     -1130       -4500      775      -2325 
  (240)      (240)      (360)     (780)       (540)      (780)     (900)     (960)     (1080)     (1500)    (900)    (1500) 
 
10     25        760         4570    3255          455      -470      1385      1680       -985       -2825    -105         195 
  (300)      (840)     (1080)   (1620)     (1620)    (1620)   (1440)   (1020)    (1560)     (1800)  (1980)    (1980) 
 
9  -175        725        3645    3545           785      -705      1870        -30      -1680       -2410     -130       -705 
  (300)      (900)     (1380)  (1380)      (1740)    (1980)   (1380)   (1380)    (1680)      (2160)   (2280)   (1980) 
 
8  -890       1095       3220     2580          640     -1275      -335       320      -1680       -1860      205        295 
  (540)      (780)     (1380)   (1620)     (1680)     (2100)  (1860)  (1380)     (1680)      (2160)  (1920)   (1980) 
 
7  -990        150          805       765         -415       -395      -480       420        -410       -1410      120        305 
  (540)     (900)      (1620)   (1860)      (2340)     (2220)  (1980)  (1380)     (1560)      (2160)  (2280)   (2220) 
 
6 -1610      -820        1885       575           -30        2280     1305    1350       -800         2235      300       545   
  (660)    (1020)     (1740)   (2100)      (2580)     (2220)   (2220) (1500)    (1800)      (2460)   (2400)  (2580) 
 
5 -1610      -400        1080     1335       -2050        3545     1035      670        305        -3010   -1690     1150 
  (660)     (1500)    (2220)   (2340)      (2700)     (2280)   (2340) (1980)     (1920)      (2760)   (2940) (2700)   
 
 
 
a. Net profits in dollars. 
b. Commissions. 
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The Treasury bill futures market may prove to be a useful vehicle for arbitrage or for 
hedging.9 In the long run, it will not prove a profitable vehicle for speculators. On the 
other hand, since in the long run almost any type of price movement can be achieved by 
a random walk series, it may not be possible to show that a particular trading rule won't 
work. As long as one or another type of trading rule produces consistent profits over a 
given time period, its advocates are unlikely to be dissuaded by arcane theoretical 
arguments about random walks; technical analysis will probably be around indefinitely. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fact that mechanical trading rules may show profits for long periods of time is not 
inconsistent with the possibility that price changes in the markets are random. One 
conclusion to be drawn from the random walk hypothesis is that, if a speculator keeps 
playing the game long enough, he will lose. Nothing in our study of the Treasury bill 
futures market would contradict this conclusion.  
 
One of the most important implications of the arc sine law is that mechanical trading 
rules such as moving averages will not be profitable in the long run. In addition to its 
particular application to financial analysis, however, the law holds some broader 
implications for the way the world works. For example, when two sports teams play, 
even though they have equal ability, the arc sine law dictates that one team will 
probably be in the lead most of the game. But the law also says that games with a close 
final score are surprisingly likely to be "last minute, come from behind" affairs, in which 
the ultimate winner trailed for most of the game.  
 
The result holds if the process generating the difference in score between the teams is 
symmetric with respect to time. Given such a process, and a close final score, a first 
reversal close to the ending buzzer (or gun, etc.) is as probable as a last reversal close 
to the beginning. Over a series of games in which close final scores are common, one 
team could easily achieve a string of several last minute victories. The coach of such a 
team might be credited with being brilliantly talented, for having created a "second half" 
team. While the coach could indeed be exceptional, there is nonetheless a good 
possibility that he owes his success to chance.  
                                                          
9 For example, both William Poole, "Using T-Bill Futures to Gauge Interest Rate Expectations," Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, Spring 1978, pp. 7-19, and Don Puglisi, "Is the Futures 
Market for Treasury Bills Efficient?" Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 1978, pp. 64-67, believe 
that arbitrage possibilities are nonexistent. For the opposite view, see Anthony J. Vignola and Charles J. 
Dale, "Is the Futures Market for Treasury Bills Efficient?" Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 1979, 
pp. 78-81, and Richard W. Lang and Robert H. Rasche, "A Comparison of Yields on Futures Contracts and 
Implied Forward Rates," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Monthly Review, December 1978, pp. 21-30.  
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Or consider identical twins with equal intelligence and ambition. The arc sine law says 
that, in any given course in school, one of the two may consistently lag the other. As a 
result, the hapless laggard may find himself being punished for his relatively poor 
performance. His indignant parents may forbid him to attend his high school basketball 
games, thereby depriving him of the opportunity of seeing a team that may be headed 
by a promising young coach who has a reputation for achieving last minute victories 
with his great second half team!  
 
 
 
